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THE STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD
"They were being sent into an image of hell. As darkness intensified, the huge flames silhouetted the shells of tall buildings on the bank high above them and cast grotesque shadows… As they approached the shore, they caught the smell of charred buildings and the sickly stench from decaying corpses under the rubble." and led to the destruction of an entire Germany army and half of another. 3 It also at one point tied down seven Soviet armies. 4 The magnitude of these figures makes the battle hard to imagine, but it is clear that Stalingrad was one of the largest and longest single battles in military history.
Stalingrad also is significant in that it marked a key turning point in the war on the Eastern
Front. While the ultimate outcome of Germany's war effort in the East probably was determined by its failure to defeat the U.S.S.R. in its 1941 campaign (Operation BARBAROSSA), Stalingrad was the high water mark of Germany's eastward advance. After its defeat at Stalingrad, the Reich never again occupied as much Soviet territory and, with brief exceptions, was in retreat.
The purpose of this paper is to examine briefly the Stalingrad campaign, with an eye to its strategic implications or lessons learned. I will first describe the conduct of the battle, including the events leading up to and immediately following it. I will then discuss the more important consequences and lessons learned, with a focus on the significant strategic and operational mistakes that led to the German defeat.
CONDUCT OF THE CAMPAIGN

THE PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE
The Battle of Stalingrad occurred a year after the Germans' invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 in Operation BARBAROSSA. The aim of BARBAROSSA was to launch a massive, surprise attack against the Soviet Union that would capture most of the territory west of the Urals and force Moscow to capitulate. BARBAROSSA did achieve some profound successes:
the Germans advanced to Leningrad in the north, the outskirts of Moscow in central Russia, and
Kharkov in the south. In the process, they encircled and annihilated Soviet divisions by the dozen, taking advantage of their mobile, armored warfare, or "blitzkrieg," tactics. But, the Soviet or "Red" Army's resistance proved stronger than expected and the campaign dragged on into the winter, for which the German troops were unprepared. A Soviet counteroffensive launched in December 1941 then brought the German advance to a halt. One reason the German advance was thwarted was Hitler's decision to attack the U.S.S.R. across a broad front from the Barents to the Black Sea, thereby diluting the German Army's, or Wehrmacht's, combat power.
Of course, the broad offensive also forced the defending Red Army to spread its forces thin, but it was more of a liability for the Germans because it prevented them from concentrating enough combat power to take Moscow-the principle strategic objective.
There were several important outcomes of BARBAROSSA that affected Germany's subsequent war effort in the East. First, since BARBAROSSA failed to defeat the Soviet Union, the war in the East would continue into a second year and further tax Germany's military resources. Secondly, the campaign cost Germany dearly in manpower and material, with the Wehrmacht sustaining over a million casualties. 5 The most important outcome, though, was that, by failing to win in the first year, the Germans gave the Soviets time to mobilize for war.
Given the vast resources of the U.S.S.R., this meant Germany would face ever increasing Soviet military capabilities as the war progressed, while her own capabilities were expended.
Although this trend was not decisive in 1942 when the Battle of Stalingrad began, it nonetheless allowed the Soviets to continue the war effort and limited Germany's war fighting capability. By 1943, the trend became more pronounced, allowing the Red Army to field many more forces than the Germans. Thus, by the Battle of Kursk in 1943, the Red Army had a superiority in manpower of more than two to one. 6 As the Russian winter relented in the spring of 1942, the German High Command planned a new offensive, Operation BLUE, for the summer. Because of Germany's losses in the previous year, this offensive would be smaller in scope and focus on the South. Hitler's aim was to interdict Soviet oil and lend-lease shipping on the Volga River, seize the oil fields in the Caucasus, and set the stage for a later advance into the Middle East. 7 On the Soviet side, the Supreme High Command, or Stavka, prepared to defend against another German offensive. Although captured documents revealed the Germans' advance would be in the South, Stalin dismissed this intelligence as a ruse and was convinced Moscow would be the German objective. 8 So, the Red Army put its main effort on defending the center of the front and, as a result, was not well-prepared for the approaching German campaign.
In the lead up to Operation BLUE, a coincidental development occurred in the South that proved costly for the Soviets. In its December 1941 counteroffensive, the Red Army had pushed a salient into the German line near Barvenkovo and, in May 1942, decided to attack from the salient to retake Kharkov and relieve German pressure elsewhere on the front. At the same time, the German Army Group South decided to envelop the salient to straighten out its line before launching Operation BLUE. Neither side was aware of the other's intentions and, as misfortune would have it, the Red Army attacked first from the middle of the salient on May 12.
It encountered little resistance because the Germans had already deployed to the sides of the salient for their own attack. With the Soviets' southern flank exposed, the Germans attacked into the Soviet rear, destroying three Soviet armies and capturing some 240,000 prisoners. The battle began on the morning of August 23, 1942 , when the Germans launched massive air strikes against the city, wreaking as much destruction and terror as possible. Over 2,000 sorties were executed on the 23 rd alone, and, by the next day, the city was in ruins. 16 As the air campaign got underway, the Germans launched a three-pronged ground attack against the city. The VI Army attacked the northern end with the objective of reaching the Volga and then rolling up the city from north to south. This was followed by an attack by the IV Panzer
Army against the southern end of the city to fix the Soviet 64 th Army and, concurrently, an attack by the VI Army in the center to split the seam between the Soviet 62 nd and 64 th Armies.
Ultimately, the aim of the Germans was to divide the 62 nd and 64 th Armies, and then annihilate them separately.
Initially, the German attacks scored significant successes. In the north, the VI Army Despite the Germans' initial successes, their advance slowed considerably as the battle continued. The reasons for this are threefold. First, desperate to hold on to the city, the Red Army and inhabitants of Stalingrad mounted a tenacious defense, with small unit formations executing hit-and-run attacks and factory employees firing antiaircraft guns and disabled tanks that still had serviceable guns. Secondly, as the Soviet forces were pushed into smaller concentric circles around the city, they had less territory to defend and, therefore, were able to respond quickly to German assaults. Finally, because of the numerous German air strikes, the city had been reduced to rubble, creating obstacles that aided the Soviet defense and inhibited maneuver by the Germans' chief weapons, their tanks. Thus, the battle evolved into one of close quarters combat amongst the burned out buildings of the city-a task for which the German mechanized units, as one author noted, "proved to be totally unfit." 17 The Soviet resistance was such that, by October, the Germans' advance had slowed to a snail's pace. Under pressure from Hitler to take the city, Paulus continued to assault it, but progress was reduced to capturing a building here or a block there. As one war correspondent observed, whereas the Germans captured Poland in 28 days, they took only "a few houses" in 28 days of fighting in Stalingrad. 18 On October 14, Paulus made an all-out push to capture the city, committing five divisions against the 62 nd Army, with the German Air Forces flying some 3,000 attack sorties in support. 19 This was the heaviest day of fighting in the battle. As one 62 nd Army officer described it, "The fighting assumed monstrous proportions beyond all possibility of measurement." 20 The attack nearly succeeded: the 62 nd Army was split into several isolated pockets and pushed back to the bank of the Volga. But, the Red Army stubbornly held on to slivers of the city and, by October 17, the German attack ground to a halt due to heavy losses.
This was the Germans' culminating point in the battle.
The protracted fighting in September and October wreaked devastation of profound proportions. Entire divisions were wiped out, only shells of buildings were left standing, and fires burned on a continual basis. As McTaggart describes it, "…the great city was like a twisted, stinking corpse, full of smoldering ruins and unburied dead." 21 The battle also took a serious toll on civilians in the captured territories, as well as on those who became prisoners of war. With the exception of some prisoners who were integrated into German units, the Germans subjected Russian civilians and prisoners alike to a horrific fate. According to Soviet sources, the Germans executed some 3,000 civilians during the fighting in the Stalingrad area and deported another 60,000 to labor camps where they had no protection from the elements.
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Certain groups, such as Jews and Soviet Communist Party officials, were specifically targeted for execution. In one instance early in the campaign, 90 Jewish children reportedly were shot by Army Group South units. 23 The Soviet treatment of German prisoners was not much better:
crippled Germans either were shot or left to fend for themselves and the rest were carted off to camps where many died of malnourishment and exposure. 24 During the rest of October and into November, the Germans continued to execute localized attacks against the 62 nd Army. But, none of these were as powerful as the one launched on October 14, and the gains were confined to single buildings or portions of buildings. Simply put, the VI Army was exhausted and Army Group B had no additional forces FIGURE 2. THE GERMAN ATTACK AT STALINGRAD 25 to commit to the fight. Of course, the Soviet forces likewise were spent and were not capable of much other than occasional, localized counterattacks. Thus, a sort of stalemate emerged in the city. Events were about to unfold, though, that would dramatically swing the battle in the Soviets' favor.
As early as September, the Stavka had recognized that, in their rapid advance to Stalingrad, the Germans had created an exposed flank along the Don River to the north of the VI Army. They also had created a smaller exposed flank to the south of the IV Panzer Army.
The two flanks were lightly defended by the III and IV Romanian Armies, respectively, augmented by German panzer units. Seeking to exploit the opportunity presented by these flanks, Stalin's top military commander, Marshal Zhukov, began planning a major Soviet counteroffensive to penetrate the flanks and envelop the Germans at Stalingrad. Codenamed
Operation URANUS, the plan called for a double envelopment of the VI Army and associated units, using three separate attacks: two attacks from the north and south, respectively, into the rear of the VI Army to form an inner "ring" around it, and a third attack from the north into territory west of the VI Army to create a second, outer ring. 26 The first ring would destroy the VI would execute the attack to the west to form the outer ring. Altogether, nine different armies were to participate in the operation. As forces were deployed to the Stalingrad area in preparation for the offensive, the Stavka employed strategic deception by deploying them first to the north, giving the Germans the impression the Red Army was reinforcing Moscow. By midNovember, most of the preparations were complete. Altogether, the Soviet forces assembled for the operation comprised over a million men, with some 900 tanks, 13,500 guns and mortars, and 1,100 aircraft. 27 The German forces that would oppose them also numbered over 1 million men, with 675 tanks, 10,000 guns and mortars, and 1,200 aircraft. 28 Thus, the two sides were fairly equivalent, the Soviets having some advantage in tanks and guns. However, also working in favor of the Soviets was the fact that many their soldiers were fresh, unlike the battle-fatigued
Germans.
As noted, the German General Staff had had misgivings about the vulnerability of the Germans' northern flank when Hitler decided to split Army Group South in two. In the course of the battle, other generals expressed similar concerns. In particular, one of the VI Army's corps commanders, General von Seydlitz, urged Paulus to hold two panzer divisions in reserve in case the Soviets attacked into the army's rear. 29 Paulus, however, dismissed this suggestion, blindly trusting to Hitler's direction and convinced the Soviets were not capable of executing a major attack. British forces were launching Operation TORCH. 31 As the scope of the Soviet counteroffensive became evident, Paulus held a meeting with his commanders three days after it began. Nearly all of them favored breaking out of the ring and withdrawing from Stalingrad, and Paulus proposed this course of action to Army Group B. 32 But, before the army group could respond, he received an order from Hitler to stay in place. 33 As the Soviet forces cut off the VI Army's supply lines and its position became more precarious, Paulus again on November 23 requested authority to break-out, stating it faced "annihilation in the immediate future" if it did not withdraw. 34 To this Hitler responded with a "Fuhrer's Order" that there was to be no withdrawal and that the VI Army would be re-supplied by air. 35 Having been rebuked twice, Paulus resigned himself to following the Fuhrer's orders. Hitler's order for VI Army to stay in place was motivated by two factors. First, he was still seized with wanting to capture Stalingrad and was unwilling to believe that the Russians might hand him a major defeat. Secondly, he was advised by his deputy, Marshall Goering, that the VI Army could survive in place by re-supplying it by air. The notion that the VI Army could be sustained by air was ludicrous, as the German Air Force did not have enough aircraft to conduct an airlift of this scale. 37 The VI Army stated it needed 700 tons of supplies per day, and the Air Force calculated it could airlift only 350 tons. 38 In actuality, even the Air Force's calculations were overly optimistic: when the airlift began, only 65 tons per day were delivered during the first two days, and the tonnage did not significantly increase afterwards. 39 As the encirclement continued, the position of the VI Army became increasingly untenable. Food had to be severely rationed, fuel and ammunition allotments were reduced, and medical supplies dwindled. Complicating the situation was the onset of the Russian winter, for which the Germans again were unprepared and which led to hypothermia and frostbite. What followed next can only be described as a tragedy of unimaginable magnitude. The Soviet forces tightened the noose around the VI Army which, like the 62 nd Army at the beginning of the battle, was pushed back into ever smaller circles around Stalingrad. Eventually, the army lost the airfields by which it was being re-supplied, and delivery of food, clothing, and medicine was reduced to air drops that were far from sufficient for the army to survive. The result was that soldiers of the VI Army began to die by the thousands-either from starvation, exposure, illness, combat injuries, or some combination of the four. This gradual death of the army, though, did provide one benefit to the German forces in the south. By tying down seven of the nine Soviet armies originally committed to Operation URANUS, the VI Army prevented them from attacking Army Groups A and Don, and this gave the two groups time to withdraw and escape being themselves enveloped. 44 On January 8, 1943, the Soviets offered the VI Army an opportunity to surrender, which Paulus rejected. Later, Paulus did seek authority to surrender, but this was forbidden by
Hitler. 45 With no surrender forthcoming, the final Soviet attack-Operation RING-was launched on January 8 to finish the VI Army off. By January 25, the Don Front reached the center of the city, splitting the VI Army in two, and on January 31, Soviet infantrymen reached Paulus's bunker, forcing him to surrender along with the bulk of his army. Two days later, an isolated German pocket in the northern part of the city also surrendered, bringing an end to the battle.
The annihilation of the VI Army and its associated elements was a huge loss for the Germans. Of the 274,000 German, Romanian, and other Axis troops who were surrounded as a result of the Soviet counteroffensive, 158,000 perished and 91,000 were taken prisoner (the remaining 25,000 were evacuated by air prior to the army's collapse). 46 The Red Army suffered even more losses, with casualties during the encirclement operation totaling 155,000 dead and 331,000 wounded. 47 Looking at the battle as whole, though, the figures are even more staggering. Total Axis losses for the battle, from August 23, 1942 to February 2, 1943, exceeded 500,000 men. 48 Again, the Soviet losses for the period were higher, with total casualties estimated at 1.1 million. 49 Nonetheless, given her commitments in Europe and Africa, and the growing strain of nearly four years of war, Germany could less afford to absorb these losses.
THE BATTLE'S POSTLUDE
As discussed earlier, during the planning of Operation URANUS, the Soviets had 
CONSEQUENCES
The campaign for Stalingrad had serious consequences for Germany in terms of manpower and material, morale, and the future course of the war on the Eastern Front and, for that matter, in Europe as a whole. These consequences are summarized below.
THE HEAVY COST OF THE BATTLE TO THE GERMANS
A major consequence of the campaign was its tremendous cost to the Germans in military forces-costs, again, that Germany could not afford. In addition to the ½ million casualties she incurred from the campaign, Germany lost some 3,500 tanks and self-propelled guns, 12,000 guns and mortars, and 3,000 aircraft. 51 This amounted to roughly half a year's worth of German war production. 52 As Zhukov concluded, "losses of such magnitude had a disastrous effect on the general strategic situation and shook the entire military machine of Nazi Germany to its foundations." 53 In terms of force structure, the battle likewise took a serious toll. The largest army in the Wehrmacht, the VI Army, was destroyed as was most of the IV Panzer Army. Three other armies-the Romanian III and IV Armies, the Italian VIII Army, and the Hungarian II Army-also were largely eliminated, bringing the total Axis losses to roughly four and a half armies. This lost force structure equated to over 50 Axis divisions. 54 The cost was high in respect to military leadership as well. Twenty-two German generals were taken prisoner at Stalingrad, including a field marshal, an army chief of staff, and at least five seasoned corps commanders. 55 As in the case of manpower and equipment, these losses in force structure and general officers could not easily be replaced.
A BLOW TO GERMAN MORALE
Another important consequence of the battle was the damage it inflicted on German morale. A three-day period of mourning was declared in Germany after the battle to recognize the many soldiers who had perished, and thousands of families came to the realization that their loved ones had perished on the banks of the Volga. Wehrmacht officers were no longer confident that the war on the Eastern Front could be won, and the confidence of German civilians in the war effort was no longer certain. Wieder and Einsiedel, who fought at Stalingrad, describe well this impact of the battle on German morale:
"This was not only a catastrophe in terms of loss of fighting power. The moral after-effects on the [German] troops and civilian population were soon apparent, as was the increased self-confidence and will to fight of the enemy who had now seized the initiative…If one takes into account the fact that we were engaged in a total war in which psychological factors are bound to play a decisive role, then the Battle of Stalingrad was something the like of which had never been heard of before." 56 The stress the German defeat wrought upon the German population was evident in anti-war riots that erupted among students in Munich after the battle.
It should be noted that the defeat at Stalingrad also negatively affected the morale of Germany's Axis partners, who lost some of their confidence in the Nazi leadership. Some of these countries sought subsequently to extricate themselves from the war.
THE SECURITY OF SOVIET OIL AND LEND-LEASE SUPPORT
A third consequence of the campaign was that, by pushing the Germans back by some 400 miles to Kharkov, it ensured the security of the Caucasus and Caspian Sea region. Indeed, by the end of the war, two out of every three Red Army trucks came from Lend-Lease sources. 61 The effect of the Lend-Lease aid was to compensate in part for the U.S.S.R.'s loss in production caused by the war and thereby help it sustain the war effort until Soviet production was back on track.
The net result of the German defeat at Stalingrad and subsequent retreat was to eliminate the German threat to these vital sources of oil and aid. With the Germans now pushed back 400 miles to the west, they would never again threaten Soviet oil or Lend-Lease from the south for the duration of the war.
SHIFT OF STRATEGIC INITIATIVE TO THE RED ARMY
Certainly the most important consequence of the battle is that, due to all the factors discussed above, it permanently shifted the strategic initiative in the east from the Germans to the Soviets. Up until the Soviet encirclement of the VI Army, it was possible the Germans could have forced the U.S.S.R. to sue for peace. Soviet industry was just beginning to rebound at the time the battle began and the Red Army's supply situation was still precarious. 62 Thus, if the Germans had won at Stalingrad, taken control of the Caucasus, and cut the Red Army's supply of oil and Lend-Lease aid from the south, it is conceivable they could have so seriously 
LESSONS LEARNED
There were many lessons learned from the Stalingrad campaign, ranging from logistics to strategy to military leadership. Some, however, stand out as especially important in respect to both the outcome of the war and modern military policy. The discussion below focuses on these key lessons.
OVERSTRETCHING OF RESOURCES
Certainly an important lesson learned from Stalingrad was the Germans' overstretching of their military resources-a factor that led to the Wehrmacht not massing enough combat power to achieve its objectives. In the Stalingrad campaign, there were two instances where the A more preferable maneuver is the envelopment, in which the enemy is caught unawares and has not prepared a deliberate defense in expectation of attack. The Germans very effectively used the envelopment earlier in the war, and it is not clear why they did not attempt such a maneuver at Stalingrad. Evidently, they believed the Red Army's defense of Stalingrad was on the brink of collapse and that another major assault or two would suffice to defeat it. As one German soldier recalled, "We were the victors and…we thought that we would capture the city in a few days. That was a mistake." 67 It also is possible Paulus believed an envelopment of the city, which probably would have required augmentation with airborne and river units to cross the river, would be too difficult to do. Whatever the case, if the Germans had enveloped Stalingrad, the Soviet 62 nd Army-cut off from its sources of sustainment-would have been eliminated.
To summarize, Stalingrad shows that, in conventional warfare, commanders should avoid frontal assaults and employ, instead, enveloping maneuvers where possible. This is not to say that the frontal assault is not an acceptable maneuver. There are cases where it is required to penetrate the enemy's line. But, it can lead to such losses that the defeat of the enemy, if it is achieved, becomes a pyrrhic victory.
THE NEED FOR RESERVES
Clausewitz said it is "an essential condition of strategic leadership that forces should be held in reserve according to the degree of strategic uncertainty." 68 When one compares the two principle leaders of the battle, General Paulus and Marshal
Zhukov, one finds a compelling contrast that no doubt influenced the battle's outcome. General
Paulus was an accomplished staff officer, but had little command experience and was not prone to take initiative. 74 Some of his evaluation reports reportedly described him as efficient, but lacking decisiveness. 75 Paulus also was prone to comply with orders without question and, having been promoted rapidly by the Nazis in the 1930s, had an unwavering faith-at least until his surrender-in the genius of Hitler. 
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Stalingrad truly was an epic battle-a long, bloody engagement that led to huge losses for both sides and, in the case of the Germans, sealed the fate of the Wehrmacht in the East. With their strength sapped by the preceding years of the war and their resources stretched, the Germans experienced a blow at Stalingrad from which they never recovered.
The result was that the strategic initiative shifted to the Soviet side, making Stalingrad the fundamental turning point in the war on the Eastern Front.
Ultimately, the defeat of the Germans in the battle can be traced to serious mistakes that they made, including stretching their resources too thin, adhering to frontal assault maneuvers, not collecting adequate intelligence, not establishing a meaningful reserve, and failing to exercise bold and adaptive leadership. These mistakes all provide important lessons that the modern military leader should keep in mind when planning and executing military campaigns.
Perhaps the most important of the above lessons is the importance for a nation not to stretch its military resources too thin. The missions given to a military should be sufficiently constrained to allow it to protect itself and mass its forces against the enemy and thereby ensure success. This is a consideration the United States should keep in mind today as it juggles numerous competing military requirements in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, the Caribbean, and elsewhere in the world.
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